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1
I. STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The undersigned (collectively, the “Amici”) are
scholars who study, teach, write, or research antitrust law
and policy. Amici have an interest in ensuring the proper
application of the antitrust laws and in the maintenance
of labor markets in accordance with the Sherman Act.
Amici have a particular interest in this matter because
a broadly and loosely defi ned “ministerial exception”
has the potential of allowing clergy to form horizontal
agreements that would normally be condemned by the
Sherman Act. A carefully crafted ministerial exception
that does not encroach on the boundaries of the Sherman
Act will not increase religious organizations’ liability
to employment-related suits from their employees, and
Amici have no direct interest in the specific outcome of
this case. However, certain professional associations of
clergy organize their labor markets through restraints
that, absent First Amendment protections, violate the
Sherman Act. Amici argue that the ministerial exception
was never designed to immunize cartel-like arrangements
such as these. In fact, Amici further submit that a
ministerial exception that conforms to the Sherman Act
will protect the hiring interests of religious organizations
and will therefore advance their constitutional freedom
to hire the clergy of their choice.1
1. Amici are identified in Appendix A. None of the Amici
has received any compensation related to this matter. The parties
to this case have fi led blanket letters consenting to the fi ling of
this brief. The letters of consent have been fi led with the Clerk.
No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no person or entity, other than the Amici, has contributed
monetarily to the preparation or submission of this brief. Amici’s
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II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Some professional associations of clergy2 have invoked
the ministerial exception to claim immunity from the
antitrust laws. In claiming immunity, these clergy feel
entitled to construct cartel-like arrangements that, absent
such immunity, would violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
The question presented in this case characterizes
the ministerial exception as a bar to most “employmentrelated lawsuits brought against religious organizations
by employees performing religious functions.” Pet.
Br. at *ii. Such a characterization leaves open the
possibility that “religious organizations” could include
professional and academic associations are indicated only for
purposes of identification and do not imply their representation
of any views other than their own.
2. Amici use the term “professional associations of clergy”
to describe unincorporated associations comprised of individual
clergy members who are not employed by the association. This is
consistent with the common defi nition of professional association,
“A group of professionals organized for education, social activity,
or lobbying, such as a bar association.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
141 (9th ed. 2009) (alternate definition omitted). Two organizations
that can be characterized as professional associations of clergy, for
example, are the Rabbinical Assembly and the Ministers Council.
The Rabbinical Assembly describes itself as “the international
association of Conservative rabbis” that, inter alia, “serves
the professional and personal needs of its membership.” http://
www.rabbinicalassembly.org/about-us. The Ministers Council
describes itself as “an autonomous, professional, multi-cultural
organization of ordained, commissioned and lay Christian leaders
within the American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A.” http://www.
ministerscouncil.com/WhoWeAre/MissionStatement.aspx.
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professional associations of clergy, in addition to churches,
religious schools, or other employers of clergy, and that
“employment-related lawsuits” could include Sherman Act
challenges to cartel-like restraints imposed by professional
associations of clergy that control an employment market,
in addition to disputes between an employer and its
employee. Accordingly, the doctrine’s parameters would
benefit from a limitation and clarification.
The ministerial exception arose from cases that
protected hierarchical religious organizations (i.e.
organizations w ith an “ecclesiastical head”) from
government intrusion into matters regarding their
employment of clergy. This Court has never applied the
ministerial exception to all matters of employment, such as
employment rules established by professional associations
and imposed upon independent congregations. The proper
scope of the ministerial exception should extend only to
hierarchical organizations, including employers of clergy,
and not to professional associations of clergy. The doctrine
is designed to insulate certain employer-employee clergy
relationships from generally applicable laws. It is not
designed to provide general antitrust (or other immunity)
to a class of individuals and groups in all employmentrelated matters.
Limiting the ministerial exception to employers and
hierarchies does not injure the Petitioner’s case nor does it
tilt the Court’s calculus of the facts in the matter at hand,
but it greatly influences the ability of independent houses
of worship in congregational denominations to seek and
hire the clergy of their choice. Because a congregation’s
selection of its religious leaders is so central to its religious
mission, an overbroad ministerial exception would limit the
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religious freedoms of independent institutions that seek
to hire clergy, thereby undermining the very objective
the doctrine is designed to advance and expanding
the ministerial exception beyond its judicial intent and
constitutional logic.
III. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION DOES NOT
PROTECT PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
As Petitioner highlights, this Court has given
constitutional protection against state interference with
the “[f]reedom to select the clergy.” Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). Protecting
this freedom, however, is not straightforward when
the interests of an independent house of worship are
in tension with a professional association of clergy. A
broadly construed ministerial exception that prohibits
“employment-related lawsuits brought against religious
organizations by employees performing religious
functions,” Pet. Br. at *ii, would inadvertently block a legal
challenge to a clergy-organized employment cartel. Such
a grant of immunity would in fact undermine the freedom
of some religious organizations to hire whom they want.
This conf lict of relig ious freedoms ar ises in
congregational denominations, which this Court has
distinguished from hierarchical denominations. In some
congregational denominations, professional associations
of clergy have organized restraints on employment and
have invoked the ministerial exception to assert immunity
from the Sherman Act. But this Court has never extended
the protections articulated in Kedroff to professional
associations.
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A. The Ministerial Exception Arose to Insulate
Hierarchical Polities from Government Intrusion
When this Court ruled in Kedroff that the Constitution
prohibits “[l]egislation that regulates … the appointment
of clergy,” Kedroff at 107-08, it emphasized the hierarchical
nature of the defendant church. As a matter of church
protocol, there was no doubt as to who in the Russian
Orthodox Church appointed clergy and where authority
for such hiring (and other) decisions lay. Id. at 115 (“This
controversy concerning the right to use St. Nicholas
Cathedral is strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government,
the power of the Supreme Church Authority of the
Russian Orthodox Church to appoint the ruling hierarch
of the archdiocese of North America.”); see also Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
708-09 (1976) (ruling, in a dispute over the defrocking of
a priest, that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments
mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions
of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of
hierarchical polity”) (emphasis supplied).
Because the hierarchical nature of the Russian
Orthodox Church was instrumental in reaching the
result in Kedroff (and because the hierarchical nature
of the Serbian Orthodox Church was instrumental in
reaching the result in Milivojevich), this Court was
careful in Kedroff to rest its decisions on the century-old
definition of “hierarchical churches” and to distinguish
them from alternative religious structures. Invoking
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 722-23 (1871),
the Kedroff Court stated that “[h]ierarchical churches
may be defined as those organized as a body with
other churches having similar faith and doctrine with a
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common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head.” Id. at
110. Hierarchical churches can be distinguished from a
congregational polity, in which “a religious congregation
… by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent
of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church
government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to
any higher authority.” Watson, 80 U.S. at 722; see also
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-09; Maryland & Va. Churches
v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring). For congregational churches, decisions
are made “by a majority of its members or by such other
local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose
of ecclesiastical government,” Watson, 80 U.S. at 724; see
also Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872)
(affi rming the reinstatement of certain church trustees
because, recognizing the congregational polity of the
Baptist church, “the majority [of church members], if they
adhere to the organization and to the doctrines, represent
the church.”).
The critical distinction between hierarchical and
congregational churches is highlighted during the hiring
of clergy. In hierarchical churches, hiring authority lies
in an “ecclesiastical head,” whereas in congregational
churches, hiring authority lies in the majority of church
members or their elected representatives.
B. The Ministerial Exception Protects Employers
and Hierarchical Polities, Not Professional
Associations
All of the cases in which this Court articulated the
ministerial exception, and all the cases cited by Petitioner to
articulate that doctrine, involved prohibiting government
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interference in a hierarchical polity. See Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (Serbian Orthodox Church); Kreshik v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (Russian Orthodox
Church); Kedroff, 344 U.S. 94 (Russian Orthodox Church);
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929)
(Roman Catholic Church). They produced rulings in which
this Court refused to interfere with or issue directives to
an authority that makes hiring and employment decisions
for clergy. These cases involved paradigmatic instances
in which an “ecclesiastical head” possessed authority to
make hiring decisions, but they would readily apply to
officers in religious organizations—such as a principal
of a religious school or a church president—that make
equivalent employment decisions concerning clergy. These
cases therefore protect other religious organizations
that directly hire and employ clergy, such as religiously
affi liated hospitals, universities, schools, and assorted
houses of worship. 3
Professional associations of clergy, however, do
not resemble these hierarchical organizations and
therefore do not fall under this Court’s characterization
of the ministerial exception. Individual members of
these professional associations are employed by other
organizations (usually houses of worship), and members
affi liate with these associations by, among other things,
paying dues and subscribing to a professional code of
conduct. Their membership is comprised only of their
individual clergy members and does not include houses
3. Petitioner, as an employer of ministers and teachers,
readily falls into this category of organizations that fit into the
case law. Therefore, applying the ministerial exception only to
ecclesiastical heads and employing organizations does not affect
Petitioner’s treatment under the doctrine.
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of worship or other employers of the clergy. While these
professional associations often create self-governing
rules that concern employment, they are not parties to
the employer-employee relationship that the ministerial
exception is designed to insulate from legislation.
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT EXPAND THE
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION TO PROTECT
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
This Court is well aware that professional associations
have a history of violating the Sherman Act, defining codes
of conduct—often under the guise of professional ethics—
that this Court found to be anticompetitive and harmful
to consumer welfare. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (finding a pledge to withhold
x-rays from insurers, organized by an association of
dentists, to violate the Sherman Act); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (finding a nonprofit foundation of doctors to have orchestrated illegal
price fi xing agreements); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof. Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (finding illegal a code
of ethics among engineers that limited price competition);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (ruling
that price schedules disseminated and enforced by a local
bar association violated the Sherman Act).
Professional associations of clergy present some
of the same dangers. Several have established rules
governing the process in which their members seek and
obtain employment that severely restrict the freedom
of independent congregations to hire whom they desire.
Specifically, certain associations have instituted policies
that (1) require their members to seek employment only
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through the association’s placement office, (2) require
congregations seeking to hire clergy to search for
candidates only through that same office, prohibiting
searches through the placement offices of alternative
associations of clergy, (3) limit whom a congregation may
interview, deeming some candidates to be inappropriate
for certain positions in spite of a congregation’s preference
to the contrary, and (4) penalize congregations and clergy
that transgress the rules, including threatening to expel
offending clergy members and preventing their contact
with hiring congregations. See, e.g., Eliot Salo Schoenberg,
Aliyah, The Rabbinical Assembly, Commission on
Placement (2001) at Appendix A.
These restrictive policies resemble restraints that
this Court has previously condemned.4 The rules that bind
fellow clergy members to a restrictive placement process
(while punishing those who do not comply) and exclude rival
organizations constitute horizontal collusion that denies
consumer choice, limits output, and restricts price. The
restrictive arrangements with independent congregations
are vertical restraints that cement the association’s
4. The First Amendment does not inoculate political, religious,
or expressive organizations from Sherman Act scrutiny, and this
Court has long permitted the Sherman Act to regulate conduct
that is primarily commercial in nature, as distinct from spiritual
or expressive conduct that enjoys First Amendment protection.
See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U.S. 411,
426-28 (1990); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,
486 U.S. 492, 508-09 (1988); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458
U.S. 886, 914-15 (1982); Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1944). Lower courts have explicitly deployed this
distinction in the religious liberty context. See, e.g.,Costello Pub.
Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035, 1048-50 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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incumbent status. Together, the rules limit both the
ability of clergy members to freely seek employment
and the freedom of participating congregations (who
hire those members as clergy) to search and pursue the
clergy member whom congregational leaders believe best
suits their spiritual needs. Congregations are unable
to implement their own placement search or assert
individual views on the appropriateness of candidates.
Barak D. Richman, Saving the First Amendment from
Itself: Relief from the Sherman Act Against the Rabbinic
Cartels, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1808005.
At least one of these associations has rhetorically
invoked the ministerial exception and related doctrines
to claim immunity from Sherman Act scrutiny of its
placement procedures, claiming that any violation of the
Sherman Act is constitutionally insulated because the
restraints involve the hiring of clergy. See Gilah Dror &
Julie Schonfeld, Statement About the Placement System,
RA News Alert (October 2010). This claim currently
serves as a purported legal justification to continue
conduct that harms both the economic welfare and the
religious interests of individual congregations. The Amici
request that this Court clarify the ministerial exception
such that it is well understood to be limited to hierarchical
organizations and equally well understood that cartel-like
arrangements by professional associations of clergy are
not constitutionally protected.
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A. Exempting Professional Associations of Clergy
from Antitrust Scrutiny Would Cause Economic
Harm that the Sherman Act is Designed to Prevent
Like any anticompetitive horizontal restraint among
competitors in a common labor market, restraints by
clergy inflict precisely the harmful economic consequences
that Congress intended to prevent when it enacted the
Sherman Act. 5
First, restraints on the placement process for clergy
limit the consumer freedoms of hiring congregations.
The exercise of consumer preferences in the marketplace,
and the economic forces that those consumer freedoms
exert, are paramount to sustaining a competitive market
and thus are at the core of antitrust law. This Court has
warned that “[a] restraint that has the effect of reducing
the importance of consumer preference … is not consistent
with this fundamental goal of antitrust law,” NCAA
v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984), and that
“[a]bsent some countervailing procompetitive virtue …
an agreement limiting consumer choice by impeding the
5. This Court has recognized that, like any other horizontal
collaboration, agreements among professional organizations have
the potential for both pro- and anticompetitive consequences. Thus,
even while refusing to “fashion[] a broad exemption under the Rule
of Reason for learned professions profession’s code of ethics,” this
Court recognized that “[e]thical norms may serve to regulate and
promote this competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason.”
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696. Many ethical and
religious standards established by professional associations of
clergy would likely survive scrutiny under the Rule of Reason,
but the restraints on the employment market described herein
are much more readily condemned under an abbreviated analysis.
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‘ordinary give and take of the market place,’ cannot be
sustained.” Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459
(quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692).
In short, the horizontal restrictions by these professional
organizations of clerg y “cr ipple the freedom” of
independent congregations as market actors and “thereby
restrain their ability to [transact] in accordance with their
own judgment.” Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S.
207, 212 (1959). Independent congregations deserve the
Sherman Act’s protection of their consumer freedoms and
interests in hiring the clergy of their choosing—in fact,
such consumer freedoms are precisely the interests the
Sherman Act was designed to protect—and restrictions
on these freedoms constitute textbook violations of the
Sherman Act.
Second, restraints that limit competition in the labor
market for clergy have precisely the economic results
predicted by accepted economic theory. Output, as
measured by the number of job applicants an independent
congregation can interview and consider for its pulpit, is
severely restricted, and such a restriction on competition
would be expected to elevate the wages secured by those
who obtain pulpits. Indeed, recent journalistic accounts
indicate that members of associations that create these
restraints are remunerated more handsomely than clergy
in denominations without those restraints. Josh NathanKazis, On the Pulpit, Rabbis Earn More Than Christian
Clergy, T HE JEWISH FORWARD (Sept. 24, 2010) (fi nding
that rabbis receive significantly higher wages—often
double or triple—than Catholic priests and Protestant
ministers). By limiting output and competition among
members and by restricting the ability of participating
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congregations to search widely for ideal candidates,
professional associations of clergy can inflate the wages
of their own members.
B. Exempting Professional Associations of Clergy
from Antitrust Scrutiny Would Restrict Religious
Expression
Nothing is more central to a congregation’s mission
than finding the religious leader that best suits its spiritual
needs. Petitioner put it best when, citing McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972), it argued
that “[t]he relationship between an organized church and
its ministers is its lifeblood.” Pet. for Cert. at 9. But an
expansive ministerial exception that permits professional
associations of clergy to implement otherwise-illegally
restrictive placement policies is at cross purposes with
this value. Petitioner continued that “allowing the state
to interfere in that relationship—effectively allowing
judges and juries to pick ministers—would produce ‘the
very opposite of that separation of church and State
contemplated by the First Amendment.’” Id. (citing
McClure, 460 F.2d at 560). Yet if a court is precluded from
enforcing the antitrust laws, then it sanctions coercive
arrangements that interfere with a congregation’s ability
to pursue its religious expression. This also is the very
opposite of what is contemplated by the First Amendment.
Indeed, McClure and its antecedents, including the
1871 ruling in Watson v. Jones, have been held to enshrine
“a spirit of freedom for religious organizations,” 460
F.2d at 560, and this Court in Kedroff explicitly added
to this general guarantee the “[f]reedom to select the
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clergy.” 344 U.S. at 116.6 If the ministerial exception
has been crafted, as these cases suggest, to ensure
that religious organizations have unfettered freedom to
select their own clergy, then a broadly crafted exception
would, given the reality of cartel-like restraints within
the professional clergy, undermine its own purpose if it
protected professional associations. More generally, if the
ministerial exception is intended to safeguard religious
freedom for religious communities, then it should not
enable arrangements that assert both economic and
religious power over independent congregations.
Alternatively, limiting the ministerial exception
to hierarchical polities with ecclesiastical heads and
to employers with unambiguous hiring authority, and
limiting the ministerial exception to employment matters
that only concern those parties’ employees, would fulfi ll
the doctrine’s purpose along all dimensions. It would
protect the internal integrity of religious organizations
yet would also ensure that the pursuits of one religious
organization do not encroach upon the freedom of others.

6. These ideals predate Watson and lie at the core of the
Framers’ conceptions of religious freedom. In an oft-cited letter
to the Reverend Samuel Miller, Thomas Jefferson wrote:
Every religious society has a right to determine for
itself the times for [its] exercises, & the objects proper
for them, according to their own particular tenets; and
this right can never be safer than in their own hands,
where the constitution has deposited it.
Letter to Rev. Samuel Miller (1808), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 174-75 (Paul Leceister Ford ed. 1899).
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In sum, the ministerial exception is designed to secure
the integrity of employment relations in hierarchical
religious organizations. But if it extends to professional
associations, the doctrine instead would infringe upon the
integrity of employing clergy. Cf. McClure, 460 F.2d at
558 (“The minister is the chief instrument by which the
church seeks to fulfi ll its purpose. Matters touching this
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime
ecclesiastical concern.”)
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Amici urge the Court to
limit the parameters of the ministerial exception such that
it does not immunize cartel-like behavior by professional
associations that otherwise would violate the Sherman
Act. Such a limitation would be consistent with this Court’s
precedents and would advance the doctrine’s underlying
purpose of protecting the integrity of religious expression.
An expansive ministerial exception would undermine that
purpose and would regrettably restrict the freedom of
independent congregations to seek out and hire the clergy
that best suit their religious needs.
Respectfully submitted,
PROFESSOR BARAK D. RICHMAN
DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Science Drive &
Towerview Road
Durham, NC 27708-0360
(919) 613-7244

16
PROFESSOR HARRY FIRST
Counsel of Record
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012
(212) 998-6211
harry.first@nyu.edu

1a
APPENDIXAppendix
— LIST OF AMICI
Joseph P. Bauer
Professor of Law
Notre Dame Law School

Peter Carstensen
George H. Young-Bascom
Professor of Law
University of Wisconsin
Law School

Andrew Chin
Associate Professor
of Law
University of North
Carolina School of Law

Harry First
Charles L. Denison
Professor of Law
New York University Law
School

Eleanor M. Fox
Walter J. Derenberg
Professor of Trade
Regulation
New York University
School of Law

Clark C. Havighurst
William Neal Reynolds
Professor Emeritus
of Law
Duke University School
of Law

Jeffrey L Harrison
Stephen C. O’Connell
Chair
University of Florida
Frederic G. Levin
College of Law

Herbert Hovenkamp
Ben V. & Dorothy Willie
Professor
The University of Iowa
College of Law

Robert H. Lande
Venable Professor of Law
University of Baltimore
School of Law

Robert Litan
Vice President of
Research and Policy
Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation

2a
Appendix
Alan J. Meese
Ball Professor of Law
and Cabell Research
Professor of Law
William and Mary
Law School

Roger G. Noll
Professor of Economics,
Emeritus
Stanford University

Barak Y. Orbach
Professor of Law
University of Arizona,
James E. Rogers College
of Law

Barak Richman
Professor of Law and
Business Administration
Duke University School
of Law

Christopher L. Sagers
Professor of Law
Cleveland State
University, ClevelandMarshall College of Law

D. Daniel Sokol
Associate Professor
of Law
University of Florida
Frederic G. Levin College
of Law

Abraham Wickelgren
Bernard J. Ward
Professor in Law
University of Texas at
Austin School of Law

